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It is not mere coincidence that several of Plato’s dialogues are 
set in gymnasia and palaistrai (wrestling schools), employ the 
gymnastic language of stripping, wrestling, tripping, even helping 
opponents to their feet, and imitate in argumentative form the 
athletic contests (agōnes) commonly associated with that place. The 
main explanation for this is, of course, historical. Sophists, orators, 
and intellectuals of all stripes, including the historical Socrates, 
really did frequent Athens’ gymnasia and palaistrai in search of 
ready audiences and potential students.3 Perhaps they were 
following the example of Pythagoras, who may have been a boxing 
coach (gymnastēs) and was, in any case, associated with the 
extraordinary Olympic success of athletes from his adopted 
Croton—success so great it generated the saying that the last of the 
Crotonites was the first among all other Greeks.4 After his visit to 
Western Greece, Plato famously established his school in or 
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adjacent to the Academy gymnasium in Athens, and he may have 
held the public office of Gymnasiarch there.5 In this essay, I would 
like to argue that there are also symbolic reasons for Plato setting 
some of his dialogues in gymnasia. These dialogues function as 
virtual gymnasia in which readers are coached by the character of 
Socrates toward an innovative ideal of aretē (virtue, excellence). 
Aretē and the Gymnasium 
Taking the last claim first, we must remember that aretē’s 
oldest associations were with athleticism. Gods such as Zeus and 
Hermes, and heroes such as Heracles and Achilles, were endowed 
with the strength and beauty that athletes strove to emulate. 
Unlike mere mortals, however, gods and heroes never trained—
their aretē derived directly from their full or partial divinity, and it 
was naturally accompanied by wisdom and eloquence. The beauty 
and athleticism of aristocratic mortals was likewise attributed to 
divine heredity and thought to require no special training. 
However, the rise of athletic festivals, the Olympic Games in 
particular, eroded such beliefs by revealing that athletic aretē could 
be acquired through training. Even as aristocrats employed 
professional coaches and gravitated toward equestrian events in 
the effort to defend their “natural superiority” using the weapon 
of their wealth, public gymnasia proliferated as places where aretē 
might be cultivated among all youth with the leisure to do so. In 
the beginning, these gymnasia were basically parks with little else 
besides groves of trees, shaded walking paths, open areas for 
exercise, a variety of religious monuments, and easy access to 
water for bathing.6 Aristophanes’s description of the Academy in 
Clouds (1005-1008) as a leafy park where “the plane-tree whispers 
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to the elm” and where good young men go to exercise and socialize 
illustrates the early gymnasium of virtue well.7 
As the idea took hold that even aristocratic young men needed 
some form of higher education to perfect their natural aretē, 
private, urban palaistrai were constructed to facilitate this. They 
were more convenient than the public gymnasia located on the 
periphery, and access to them could be controlled. It is just such a 
facility that Hippothales pulls Socrates into at the beginning of 
Lysis, as the philosopher is making his way between two public 
gymnasia, the Academy and the Lyceum (203a). Given that 
gymnasia and palaistrai were recognized as places for training 
aretē, it is no surprise that they attracted teachers of oratory and 
argumentation, since eloquence and debating skill were also 
considered signs of excellence. In Antidosis, the rhetorician 
Isocrates argues that aretē is achieved through parallel training in 
the “twin arts” of philosophy and gymnastics, which “employ 
similar methods of instruction and exercise.”8 By “philosophy,” 
however, Isocrates intends the art of oratory, which imparts what 
he calls worthwhile aretē—in contrast with those who “profess to 
turn men to a life of temperance and justice…a kind of virtue and 
wisdom which is ignored by the rest of the world and disputed 
among themselves.”9 
                                                     
7 Aristophanes, Aristophanes Comoediae, ed. F.W. Hall and W.M. Geldart, vol. 2. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907): ἀλλ᾽ εἰς Ἀκαδήμειαν κατιὼν ὑπὸ ταῖς 
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βολούσης,/ ἦρος ἐν ὥρᾳ χαίρων, ὁπόταν πλάτανος πτελέᾳ ψιθυρίζῃ. 
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1980), 182: ἀντιστρόφους καὶ σύζυγας καὶ σφίσιν αὐταῖς ὁμολογουμένας, 
δι᾽ ὧν οἱ προεστῶτες αὐτῶν τάς τε ψυχὰς φρονιμωτέρας καὶ τὰ σώματα 
χρησιμώτερα παρασκευάζουσιν, οὐ πολὺ διαστησάμενοι τὰς παιδείας 
ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων, ἀλλὰ παραπλησίαις χρώμενοι καὶ ταῖς διδασκαλίαις καὶ 
ταῖς γυμνασίαις καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιμελείαις. 
9 Isocrates, Antidosis, 84. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην καὶ τὴν 
δικαιοσύνην προσποιουμένων προτρέπειν ἡμεῖς ἂν ἀληθέστεροι καὶ 
χρησιμώτεροι φανεῖμεν ὄντες. οἱ μὲν γὰρ παρακαλοῦσιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν 
καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων μὲν ἀγνοουμένην, ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν δὲ 
τούτων ἀντιλεγομένην, ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπὸ πάντων ὁμολογουμένην. 
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Isocrates’s thinly-veiled reference to Socrates here should 
remind us that the Platonic understanding of aretē as a highly 
intellectualized “health of the soul” to be achieved through 
dialectical agōn must have been a radical innovation in its day. 
Isocrates, like many people, envisioned gymnastics as education 
strictly for the body and rhetorical education as sufficient for 
intellectual virtue. Plato’s Socrates, however, explicitly rejects the 
former idea in Republic,10 and attacks the latter with his own thinly 
veiled reference to Isocrates toward the end of Euthydemus as 
someone who fails to teach his students how to use their rhetorical 
skills, and thereby proving that “the art of speech writing is not the 
one a man would be happy if he acquired” (289d). This “art of 
happiness” is, instead, the Platonic idea of aretē, and Plato’s 
gymnastic dialogues not only make the case—in opposition to his 
educational rivals—that there is a philosophical component of 
aretē which must be trained separately from (though not exclusive 
of) technical training in gymnastics, military arts, argumentation, 
and oratory, they also provide that training for their readers to 
some degree. Indeed some of them may have been written for the 
express purpose of being read and discussed in Plato’s Academy. 
The Philosophical Gymnasium 
Reading and discussion would not have been the only 
activities taking place at Plato’s Academy. In fact, the kind of 
building where such discussions usually took place, does not 
appear at the Academy until decades after Plato’s school is 
established.11 Rather, Plato would have directed all the traditional 
                                                     
10 Socrates says, instead, that both gymnastikē and mousikē were established 
“chiefly for the sake of the soul,” concluding further down: “It seems, then, 
that a god has given music and physical training to human beings not, 
except incidentally, for the body and the soul, but for the spirited and 
wisdom-loving parts of the soul itself, in order that these may be in harmony 
with one another, each being stretched and relaxed to an appropriate 
degree” (411e). This and all other English translations of Plato are taken 
from John Cooper, ed., Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997). 
11 Plato’s school was inaugurated around 387 BCE. At the Academy, there is no 
archaeological evidence of a palaistra until the second half of the fourth 
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activities of the gymnasium toward the goal of improving the 
soul.12 In Plato’s dialogues, music, gymnastics, military training, 
and even erotic relationships are reinterpreted to promote Plato’s 
philosophical understanding of aretē.13 At Republic 410c, Socrates 
says specifically that the goal of music and gymnastics is to 
harmonize the soul14—a declaration that reveals two key 
assumptions behind Plato’s gymnastic philosophy. The first is that 
the soul is the origin of human movement,15 so moving the body 
                                                     
century BCE. See Ada Caruso, Akademia: Archeologia di una scuola filosofica ad 
Atene da Platone a Proclo (Athens: Scuola Archaeological Italiana di Atene 
Pandemos, 2013). 
12 This is the general thesis of “Plato’s Gymnasium” in Heather L. Reid, Athletics 
and Philosophy in the Ancient World: Contests of Virtue (London: Routledge, 
2011), 66-68. 
13 Plato uses his own athletic analogy to provide a vivid illustration of the 
harmonious (and therefore just and virtuous) soul in another dialogue, 
Phaedrus. There, the tripartite psychē is likened to a two-horse chariot, the 
charioteer apparently representing the rational part of the soul, one good 
and noble horse the spirited part of the soul, and a second unruly horse the 
appetitive part (246ab). The chariot-soul’s struggle for aretē is described as 
an upward climb toward truth and divinity that is especially difficult for 
humans because “the heaviness of the bad horse drags its charioteer toward 
the earth and weighs him down if he has failed to train it well” (247b). 
Keeping in mind the popularity of chariot racing in the ancient games, and 
noting the passage’s use of athletic language such as ponos (effort) and agōn 
(contest), we might recognize a connection between the psychē’s struggle for 
virtue and the athlete’s struggle for victory. Both struggles, like the chariot, 
require the harmonization and cooperation of all the soul’s parts in order to 
achieve their goals. Perhaps Plato is suggesting that the athletic struggle for 
victory can prepare one’s soul for its lifelong struggle for virtue. For the full 
argument see H.L. Reid, “Sport as Moral Education in Plato’s Republic,” 
Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 34:2 (2007): 160-175, 163. 
14 At Republic 410c, Socrates says that both gymnastikē and mousikē were 
established “chiefly for the sake of the soul,” concluding further down that 
“a god has given music and physical training to human beings not, except 
incidentally, for the body and the soul, but for the spirited and wisdom-
loving parts of the soul itself, in order that these may be in harmony with 
one another, each being stretched and relaxed to an appropriate degree” 
(411e). 
15 In fact, for Homer, the psychē was life itself and the word for body, sōma, 
signified a corpse—a body lacking in movement because its psychē had 
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can actually train the soul. The second is that aretē (virtue, 
excellence) is understood as a kind of health and harmony in the 
soul, which, like bodily health, requires continual exercise or 
training (askēsis).16 This exercise can be either physical or 
intellectual (ideally, it would be both). The issue is not so much the 
activity as its orientation. It needs to aim at Platonic virtue, which 
is to say at improvement of the soul, which is to say wisdom, which 
is to say philosophy. 
In contrast with the conventional idea of a kaloskagathos 
(beautiful and good person), Plato’s is an inside-out 
understanding of aretē, athleticism, and beauty. For him, even 
athleticism is a property of the soul—so much so that he imagines 
the athletic female Atalanta choosing to be reincarnated in a male 
body (Republic 620b). Socrates states clearly that a fit body does not 
produce virtue in the soul, but rather that the soul’s aretē makes 
the body as good as possible (Republic 403d). Likewise, it is not 
victory that makes an argument valuable. And it is not mere 
eloquence that makes a speech admirable (kalon). Rather it is the 
aretē in a person’s soul that renders all their actions—from 
argumentation to athletics—beautiful and good (kala-kagatha). The 
problem is that most people think, like Isocrates, that skill (technē) 
in athletics, argumentation, oratory, or whatever is sufficient for 
aretē. It is, after all, sufficient for Olympic victory, prevailing in 
lawsuits, and persuading large crowds. As Socrates argued in 
Plato’s Apology, however, craftsmen’s knowledge enables them to 
                                                     
escaped it at death. Plato uses the word sōma to signify living bodies and he 
considers the psychē to be the seat of reason, but he does not seem to have 
abandoned the idea that the psychē, and most specifically the spirited part 
of the soul, thymos, is what moves the body. For an excellent discussion of 
these terms and ideas, see Bruno Snell, The Discovery of the Mind in Greek 
Philosophy and Literature (New York: Dover, 1982), 8-22. For an update, see 
Brooke Holmes, The Symptom and the Subject: The Emergence of the Physical 
Body in Ancient Greece (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
16 Plato uses the virtue-as-health analogy in many dialogues. Here is one example 
from Republic: “Virtue seems, then, to be a kind of health, fine condition, and 
well-being of the soul, while vice is disease, shameful condition, and 
weakness” (444de). 
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perform their skill well, but it does not amount to aretē because it 
does not empower them to direct that skill toward the good (22d). 
So a primary task of Plato’s gymnasium, and of his gymnastic 
dialogues is to distinguish this innovative conception of aretē from 
its conventional association with athletic, oratorical, and 
argumentative technē. The health of the soul is the aim of every 
gymnastic activity and every gymnastic dialogue. The beginning 
of Laches even recounts a deliberation about this. A pair of fathers 
comes for counsel from two generals on educating their sons in 
military virtue. They are watching a demonstration of fighting in 
armor (presumably at a gymnasium), but all parties eventually 
agree that their goal is “a form of study for the sake of the souls of 
young men” (185de). They decide that worthy teachers would be 
“good themselves and have tended the souls of many young men” 
(186a). Socrates goes on to lament disingenuously that he lacked 
the money to be made “kalon te kagathon” by a sophist and says he 
is “unable to discover the art, even now” (186c). It turns out, 
however, that Socrates is exactly the instructor they need. 
Likewise, in the gymnastic dialogues, Socrates coaches readers by 
demonstrating his method, defeating dangerous views, and being 
an (unexpected) example of aretē. The dialogues also challenge 
readers to engage in dialectic and test their own understandings of 
aretē—which turns out to be a process that actually cultivates aretē 
in them. 
Stripping and Exposure 
Plato’s gymnastic dialogues generally begin—as any visit to a 
gymnasium would—with stripping. Here, it is the metaphorical 
stripping of Socrates’s sophistic opponents and the exposure of 
their technai as inadequate for achieving aretē. Euthydemus is 
actually set in the apodyterion (undressing room) of the Lyceum 
gymnasium.17 Scholars call the process elenchos—which means to 
                                                     
17 Euthydemus 272e. Socrates comments that Euthydeums and Dionysodorus 
joined him after making just two or three laps of the “katastegnō dromō” 
(273a). Since it was while walking around this covered walkway that 
philosophers worked out their theories (this may even be a specific 
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test, examine, refute, and even to shame. In the gymnastic 
dialogues it serves as consumer due diligence, since the sophists 
being examined are generally selling instruction in aretē. When 
Socrates asks Euthydemus what he teaches, the response is clear: 
“Virtue,” he says, “and we think we can teach it better than anyone 
else and more quickly” (Euthydemus 273d). As Socrates counsels 
Hippocrates in Protagoras, however, “the sophist is really a sort of 
merchant or dealer (kapēlos) in provisions on which a soul is 
nourished,” and just as vendors may hawk unwholesome food in 
the marketplace, sophists may be “ignorant which of their wares 
is good or bad for the soul” (313cd).18 Socrates says in Laches that 
he was too poor to buy kalokagathia (186c), but the real point is that 
kalokagathia cannot be bought, it has to be trained—separately from 
skills like argumentation, rhetoric, and wrestling—through 
philosophy. 
Socrates’s stripping and exposure of the sophists does not 
imply that their skills are worthless, just that they are inadequate 
as education for aretē. Socrates demonstrates that Gorgias’s technē 
of persuasion is achieved without understanding (454e-455a). And 
when Socrates points out that such skills may be abused, Gorgias 
defends himself with an athletic analogy:  
Imagine someone who after attending a wrestling school, 
getting his body into good shape and becoming a boxer, 
went on to strike his father and mother or any family 
member or friend. By Zeus, that’s no reason to hate 
physical trainers.” (Gorgias 456d) 
It is, however, a reason to think that supplemental moral education 
is needed. The point is reinforced by the example of Euthydemus 
and Dionysodorus, who are described by Socrates as pancratists 
capable of fighting not only in athletic contests, but also in the 
battle (agōn) of the law courts. “They have become so skilled in 
                                                     
reference to the peripatos that eventually gave Aristotle’s school its name), 
Socrates’s comment may suggest that they are not “real philosophers” but 
are offering some quick and cheap substitute. 
18 W.R.M. Lamb trans., Plato in Twelve Volumes (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1967). 
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fighting in arguments,” Socrates concludes, “[they can refute] 
whatever may be said, no matter whether it is true or false” 
(Euthydemus 271c-272b). Aristophanes had long since warned us of 
the danger of such skills. Just as the athlete needs a sense of the 
good in order to orient his skills toward virtuous action, skills in 
persuasion and argumentation need philosophical guidance. 
The stripping and exposure of Socratic elenchos, like stripping 
for exercise in a gymnasium, should not be seen as an exercise in 
humiliation. As the myth in Gorgias shows, fair judgment of aretē 
requires psychic nudity—both for the judge and the judged. In that 
myth, Zeus puts a stop to bad judgment in the afterlife by 
requiring that both judges and judged be naked.  
Next, they must be judged when they’re stripped naked 
of all [worldly adornments], for they should be judged 
when they’re dead. The judge, too, should be naked, and 
dead, and with only his soul he should study only the 
soul of each person immediately upon his death, when 
he’s isolated from all his kinsmen and has left behind on 
earth all that adornment, so that the judgment may be a 
just one.” (Gorgias 523e) 
The judgment takes place after death, because that is when the soul 
is stripped of its biggest adornment, the body (524d). Socrates 
believes that injustice and incontinence—in other words, lack of 
virtue—make the soul ugly (Gorgias 525a). Aretē is what makes 
souls beautiful, and like the athletic fitness that makes bodies 
beautiful, it requires gymnastic training that begins with stripping 
down. 
Training with the Master 
Socrates, for his part, says he’ll “reveal to the judge a soul 
that’s as healthy as it can be.” He says he’ll do this by disregarding 
the things that most people care about and by “practicing truth” 
(Gorgias 526de). The verb he uses, askein, is most properly applied 
to athletic training or exercise. “Practicing truth” or “practicing 
wisdom and virtue” (Euthydemus 283a) are both short, gymnastic 
answers to the very complicated question of how Socratic aretē 
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might be achieved. They make it clear, however, that aretē is 
achieved in and through activity, and—like any skilled activity—
they suggest that it must be learned through a kind of 
apprenticeship. It is not simply a matter of conventional 
knowledge, of memorizing formulas or recognizing terminology. 
As in the acquisition of a second language, we not only have to 
learn the vocabulary and grammar, we need to be able to speak, 
ultimately without effort and conscious calculation. And one of the 
first things we look for in learning this and other skills is a master, 
one who consistently demonstrates excellence in the desired skill. 
In Laches, Socrates emerges as a master of virtue, first because 
“he is always spending his time in places where the young men 
engage in any study or noble pursuit of the sort you are looking 
for” (Laches 180c), and second because he has demonstrated his 
valor in battle, his aretic art has a recognizably excellent product. 
Says Laches, “He marched with me in the retreat from Delium, and 
I can tell you that if the rest had been willing to behave in the same 
manner, our city would be safe and we would not then have 
suffered a disaster” (181b). Laches observes that Socrates not only 
discusses virtue, his actions also demonstrate virtue. He compares 
this to a musical “harmony” that is “genuinely Greek” (188d). 
Socrates reinforces the harmony metaphor at Gorgias 482bc, noting 
he would rather have everyone disagree with him “than to be out 
of harmony with [himself].” Plato’s depiction of Socrates in the 
gymnastic dialogues, and especially in the Apology, is clearly 
presented as an example to be imitated. He is a kind of aretic hero 
and his story as presented by Plato may be analogous to Achilles’s 
story in the Iliad. 
But Socrates’s aretē is something different from Achilles’s, and 
besides the heroic task of defeating sophistic monsters (a task he 
refers to as “labors” (ponoi), evoking Heracles, at Apology 22a), we 
might ask just how Socrates is actually “training” aretē in the 
gymnastic dialogues. The answer comes back to the issue of 
guidance and orientation. Like athletes and heroes, Socrates 
engages in dialectical struggle (agōn), but unlike eristics and 
rhetoricians, the goal of his agōn is wisdom. The subject of this 
agōn, furthermore, is aretē. And so there is a kind of double 
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movement—it is by struggling to understand what aretē is that we 
cultivate it. The concept is illustrated in Laches with a metaphor 
about putting sight into eyes.  
Suppose we know that sight, when added to the eyes, 
makes better those eyes to which it is added, and 
furthermore, we are able to add it to the eyes, then clearly 
we know what this very thing sight is, about which we 
should be consulting as to how one might obtain it most 
easily and best. (Laches 190ab)  
To put virtue into the soul, likewise, we must first strive to 
understand what virtue is. And it is through the attempt to 
understand what virtue is—the directing of our discussion toward 
wisdom—that we begin to achieve it. 
Training One’s Sights on Wisdom 
In the gymnastic dialogues, virtue almost always turns out to 
be some kind of wisdom. In Laches, it is wisdom that makes 
“endurance of the soul” good and beautiful (kalē kagathē) (192c). 
Eventually, the argument leads to the hypothesis that courage 
amounts to the knowledge of good and evil (199cd). This is 
rejected, but only because it would imply that courage is no 
different from the other parts of virtue (i.e., justice, temperance, 
and piety) and they had previously agreed that courage could only 
be part of virtue (199e); but this is not Plato’s considered view. In 
Euthydemus it is established that wisdom obviates any need for 
good fortune (280b) because it allows us to put goods such as 
wealth and health and beauty (and perhaps even skills like 
argumentation) to good use—to render them beneficial (281ab). 
Concludes Socrates,  
it seems likely that with respect to all the things we called 
good in the beginning, the correct account is not that in 
themselves they are good by nature, but rather as follows: 
if ignorance controls them, they are greater evils than 
their opposites, to the extent that they are more capable 
of complying with a bad master; but if good sense and 
wisdom (phronēsis kai sophia) are in control, they are 
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greater goods. In themselves, however, neither sort is of 
any value.” (Euthydemus 281de)  
The wisdom appropriate to aretē turns out to be a kind of art 
(technē), but it is a special kind that rules over the other arts—
directing them toward the good. As Socrates tells young Clinias, 
“what we need, my fair friend…is a kind of knowledge which 
combines making and knowing how to use the thing which it 
makes” (Euthydemus 289b). In the end this is identified as a “kingly 
art” (basilikē technē) which rules all the products of the other crafts 
(291d). This metaphor of wise management will be perfected in 
Republic, but it is present in the gymnastic dialogues like Gorgias as 
well.  
The best way in which the excellence (aretē) of each thing 
comes to be present in it, whether it’s that of an artifact or 
of a body or a soul as well, or of any animal, is not just 
any old way, but is due to whatever organization, 
correctness, and craftsmanship is bestowed on each of 
them. (Gorgias 506d)19  
Ultimately, the Gorgias describes virtue as a kind of 
“helmsmanship, which saves not only souls, but also bodies and 
valuables from the utmost dangers.” (511d).20 Socrates’s ability to 
“steer” his trial and execution, despite their apparent injustice, 
toward the ideals of virtue and justice is a paradigmatic example 
of this navigational aretē. By his example in the dialogue, 
furthermore, he guides not just his interlocutors, but also attentive 
readers toward the good.  
                                                     
19 “ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἥ γε ἀρετὴ ἑκάστου, καὶ σκεύους καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς αὖ 
καὶ ζῴου παντός, οὐ τῷ εἰκῇ κάλλιστα παραγίγνεται, ἀλλὰ τάξει καὶ 
ὀρθότητι καὶ τέχνῃ, ἥτις ἑκάστῳ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῶν: ἆρα ἔστιν ταῦτα;” 
20 The nautical imagery appears also at Laws 803a-b: “I’m trying to distinguish for 
you the various ways in which our character shapes the kind of life we live; 
I really am trying to ‘lay down the keel,’ because I’m giving proper 
consideration to the way we should try to live—to the “character-keel” we 
need to lay if we are going to sail through this voyage of life successfully.”  
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Socrates not only theorizes his understanding of aretē as 
guidance toward the good, he demonstrates it like a good coach 
should, and even invites his charges to get involved. In 
Euthydemus, Socrates matches the argumentative skill of the 
“pancratist” brothers, defeating them repeatedly at their own 
game. The ultimate point is that argument must be more than just 
a game if it is to lead to wisdom and virtue. Socrates describes 
Dionysodorus picking up the argument “as though it were a ball” 
and aiming at the boy, Clinias (Euthydemus 277b). The philosopher 
also intervenes to encourage Clinias while “Euthydemus was 
hastening to throw the young man for the third fall,” as in 
wrestling (277d). Ultimately Euthydemus and Dionysodorus fail 
not because they lack skill but because they aim at victory rather 
than wisdom. Their argument, says Socrates, has the old trouble of 
falling down itself in the process of knocking down others (288a). 
The misuse of argumentation for sport reduces it to child’s play or 
frivolity (paidia) because, as Socrates puts it,  
even if a man were to learn many or even all such things, 
he would be none the wiser as to how matters stand but 
would only be able to make fun of people, tripping them 
up and overturning them by means of the distinctions in 
words, just like the people who pull the chair out from 
under a man who is going to sit down and then laugh 
gleefully when they see him sprawling on his back. 
(Euthydemus 278bc) 
The frivolous paidia of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus contrasts 
starkly with their advertised goal of paideia (education). 
Misdirection from lack of virtue not only prevents a technē 
from being beneficial, it can prevent the technē from truly being a 
technē at all. This is the thought behind Socrates’s accusation in 
Gorgias that oratory isn’t a craft, but merely a “knack” because all 
it really produces is gratification and pleasure (462a-c). He goes on 
to characterize it as “flattery” (kolakeia)—something that actively 
corrupts a true craft, the way cosmetics corrupts gymnastics and 
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pastry-baking corrupts medicine.21 Flattery “guesses at what is 
pleasant with no consideration for what is best” (464d-465c), 
thereby sacrificing what is truly good and noble in favor of a more 
easily achieved appearance of it. Socrates accuses oratory of 
flattering justice, whereas it and every other craft “is always to be 
used in support of what’s just” (527c).22 The tendency to engage in 
flattery is only exacerbated by the commercial pressures alluded 
to in Protagoras. If a teacher’s goal is to make money, the 
temptation to aim one’s craft at pleasure rather than truth can be 
strong. But the good man, as Socrates points out in Gorgias, always 
keeps his product in view (503de). That product for the craftsman 
of virtue is good and beautiful actions, which derive from aretē, 
which derives from the love and pursuit of wisdom (philosophia). 
Readers Are Expected to Engage in Aretic Gymnastics 
Philosophy turns out to be the “practice of aretē” and the 
gymnastic dialogues provide a “place” where the reader is invited 
to practice philosophy. The experience may be more analogous to 
an engaged spectator at a wrestling match than to actually 
competing in a wrestling match. But, like an engaged spectator, we 
learn to discern the most skillful moves and responses, and 
perhaps to anticipate them mentally as the dialogue goes forward. 
The aporetic nature of these works—the fact that no final answer to 
the questions they pose is given—invites us to continue the debate 
with friends or even in our own minds. We may be rooting for 
Socrates in the debate, but we are not supposed to imagine him 
having the answer. He is an experienced coach or guide, searching 
                                                     
21 Socrates explains with an analogy between fitness in the body and fitness in the 
soul. Just as cosmetic may create the mere appearance of bodily fitness, 
which is properly gained through gymnastics, oratory may create the mere 
appearance of virtue in the soul, which is properly gained through 
philosophy (Gorgias 464a). See Dombrowski’s essay in this volume. 
22 Socrates points to himself as an example of the proper use of oratory, which he 
calls the political craft: “I believe that I’m one of a few Athenians—so as not 
to say I’m the only one, but the only one among our contemporaries—to 
take up the true political craft and practice the true politics. This is because 
the speeches I make on each occasion do not aim at gratification but at 
what’s best. They don’t aim at what’s most pleasant” (Gorgias 521de). 
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alongside us for wisdom: “For the things I say I certainly don’t say 
with any knowledge at all; no, I’m searching together with you so 
that if my opponent clearly has a point, I’ll be the first to concede 
it” (Gorgias 506a). Socrates even invites us readers, along with his 
interlocutors, to challenge his hypotheses. “Please don’t falter in 
doing a friend a good turn,” he says to Polus, “Refute me” (Gorgias 
470c). 
There is a sense that we, as readers, are competing with 
Socrates to understand aretē, but that is not the same as competing 
against him, and it is not for victory that we are competing. We are 
competing, like enlightened athletes, for the sake of mutual 
improvement, for the sake of aretē. Socrates says he is pleased to 
have met Callicles, who challenged him so fiercely, because the 
argument has functioned for Socrates’s soul like a stone used to 
test the purity of gold (Gorgias 486de). “You love to win,” Callicles 
says to Socrates, and the philosopher does not deny it. “But it’s not 
for love of winning (philonikia) that I’m asking you,” he explains, 
“It’s rather because I really do want to know” (Gorgias 515b). We 
compete with Socrates not for philonikia, but rather for philosophia. 
And philosophia, because it is love of wisdom and not some 
perfected state of wisdom, can be practiced even with opponents 
who care only about victory, or opponents who are nothing more 
than characters in a dialogue. We become philosophers in the 
Socratic sense by thinking about and debating virtue, and like 
every skill, we get better through practice. As the Gorgias 
concludes, 
Nothing terrible will happen to you if you really are a 
kaloskagathos, one who practices excellence (askōn aretein). 
And then, after we’ve practiced it together […] then we’ll 
deliberate about whatever subject we please, when we’re 
better at deliberating than we are now. (Gorgias 527d) 
Even if the gymnastic dialogues fail to involve us in their 
debates, just as Socrates fails to get Theodorus to strip and wrestle 
with Theaetetus in the dialogue of the same name, it is enough that 
they inspire us to love wisdom—since it is that love that orients 
the “helmsman” of virtue, just as surely as the stars orient the 
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helmsman of a ship. Socrates sets the example, commenting in 
Gorgias that just as lovers believe whatever their beloved says, he 
believes whatever his beloved, Philosophy, says, “and she’s by far 
less fickle than my other beloved” [i.e., Alcibiades] (482a). In 
Euthydemus, the boy Clinias is exhorted that it is “necessary to love 
wisdom” (282d), “become wise and good” (282e), and to “practice 
(askein) wisdom and virtue” (283a). The argument with 
Dionysodorus has been an “incitement to virtue” (283b). Every 
gymnastic dialogue is likewise an incitement to philosophy, and 
therefore virtue. Most of them even end with a promise to continue 
the discussion—and most readers silently count themselves in on 
the promise. Gorgias ends with the good coach Socrates calling 
everyone “to this way of life, this contest (agōn), that I hold to be 
worth all the other contests in this life” (Gorgias 526e). And he 
exhorts us in Euthydemus to “pay no attention to the practitioners 
of philosophy but rather to the thing itself….to take it to heart, 
pursue it, and (askē) practice it” (307c).  
